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Why is Corruption Less Harmful in Some
Countries Than in Others?∗
Keith Blackburn†and Gonzalo F. Forgues-Puccio‡
Abstract
Empirical evidence shows that not all countries with high levels
of corruption have suﬀered poor growth performance. Bad quality
governance has clearly been much less damaging (if at all) in some
economies than in others. Why this is so is a question that has largely
been ignored, and the intention of this paper is to provide an answer.
We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which growth
occurs endogenously through the invention of new goods based on re-
search and development activity. For such activity to be undertaken,
ﬁrms must acquire complementary licenses from public oﬃcials who
are able to exploit their monopoly power by demanding bribes in ex-
change for these (otherwise free) permits. We show that the eﬀects of
corruption depend on the extent to which bureaucrats coordinate their
rent-seeking behaviour. Speciﬁcally, our analysis predicts that coun-
tries with organised corruption networks are likely to display lower
levels of bribes, higher levels of research activity and higher rates of
growth than countries with disorganised corruption arrangements.
Keywords: Organised corruption, disorganised corruption, inno-
vation, growth.
JEL classification: D73, O11, O31, O41.
∗The authors are grateful for the comments of two anonymous referees on an earlier
version of the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
†Centre for Growth and Business Cycles Research, Economic Studies, University of
Manchester.
‡School of Economics and Finance, University of St. Andrews.
Address for correspondence: Gonzalo F. Forgues-Puccio, School of Economics
and Finance, University of St. Andrews, Castlecliﬀe, The Scores, St Andrews, KY16
9AL, United Kingdom. Tel: +44 1334 462 442. Fax: +44 1334 462 444. E-mail:
gﬀ2@st-andrews.ac.uk.
1
Page 2 of 34
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
1 Introduction
There is now a broad consensus amongst development experts that the qual-
ity of governance plays a vital role in shaping the fortunes of an economy.
Bad quality governance fosters corruption, which can lead to ineﬃciencies
and resource costs that impede economic progress.1 This view is supported
by a large empirical literature that has ﬂourished over recent years as a result
of new and improved measures of corrupt activity. Armed with such data, a
number of authors have undertaken analyses which reveal that corruption has
signiﬁcant adverse eﬀects on growth (e.g., Gyimah-Brempong 2002; Keefer
and Knack 1997; Knack and Keefer 1995; Li et al. 2000; Mauro 1995; Mo
2001; Sachs and Warner 1997). These, and other, investigations have also
indicated various ways in which corruption takes hold, such as lowering rates
of investment (e.g., Mauro 1995), creating obstacles to doing business (e.g.,
World Bank 2002), reducing inﬂows of foreign investment (e.g., Wei 2000)
and causing misallocations of public expenditures (e.g., Mauro 1997; Tanzi
and Davoodi 1997). The scale of the oﬀences involved, and the ingenuity of
those that perpetrate them, are often quite staggering, as a wealth of anecdo-
tal evidence reveals. Given all of this, it is not surprising that most, if not all,
international development agencies have made the ﬁght against corruption a
leading, if not the foremost, priority in their agendas for alleviating poverty.2
It is undoubtedly true that many countries of the world have suﬀered,
and continue to suﬀer, as a result of widespread misgovernance. Yet it is
also true that there are some countries for which high levels of corruption
have appeared to do little to damage growth prospects. The most prominent
examples are to be found in South-East Asia, motivating what Wedeman
(2002a) has labelled the “East Asian paradox”. Countries such as China,
Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand have all enjoyed considerable growth
in their per-capita incomes whilst enduring the reputation of being mired
with corruption. There are even some developed countries (most notably,
Italy) that share the same notoriety. Such observations suggest that there
1The most commonly-used deﬁnition of corruption is the abuse of public oﬃce for
personal gain. Governance is deﬁned rather more broadly than this, though the two
concepts are intimately connected: just as bad governance fosters corruption, so corruption
undermines good governance.
2For numerous accounts of corrupt practices and strategies for combatting them, see
the web-sites of the World Bank (www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt),
the IMF (www.imf.org/external/np/exp/facts/gov.htm), the United Nations
(www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption.htm/) and the Free Africa Foundation
(www.freeafrica.org). For broad surveys of the literature on corruption, see Bard-
han (1997), Jain (2001), Rose-Ackerman (1999) and Tanzi (1998). And for an up-to-date
review of the empirical evidence on corruption, see Lambsdorﬀ (2006).
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is more to the relationship between corruption and development than one is
typically led to believe. Indeed, it would appear that, in some instances, this
relationship is rather fragile and tenuous.
By way of illustrating the above, we present some summary statistics
in Table 1, constructed using cross-country data on growth from the Penn
World Table and cross-country data on corruption from Transparency Inter-
national.3 We report the average growth rates and average corruption ratings
over the period 1980-1999 for selected regions of the world - the lesser devel-
oped, and reputedly more corrupt, regions. As is seen, these regions share
similar corruption ratings, but their growth performances are very diﬀerent.
The sub-Saharan African and Latin American zones provide the classic ex-
amples where high corruption is accompanied by low growth.4 This is not
observed, however, for the South and South-East Asian zone. A closer look
at this region reveals some interesting features. In accordance with the ﬁnd-
ings of others (e.g., Hutchcroft 1994, 2000; Khan 1998, 2000; Lee 1995, 2000;
Rock 1999, 2000; Wedeman 2002b), we may divide the region into three dis-
tinct groups of countries: the low corruption and high growth economies of
Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore; the high corruption and low growth
economies of the Philippines and South Asia; and the high corruption and
high growth economies of China, Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand. Nat-
urally, the question that arises is what is so special about this last group of
countries that has enabled them to grow in spite of being saddled with poor
quality governance? How might one explain this East Asian paradox? More
3The latter of these datasets is originally given as a “transparency perception index”
(TPI), which ranks countries in terms of perceived levels of corruption on a decreasing
scale from 10 to 0. This index is constructed as a “poll of polls”, combining the re-
sults of questionnaire surveys sent by various organisations to networks of correspondents
around the world. It was ﬁrst published in 1995 and has since been updated annually.
For periods prior to this, Transparency International provide similar indices using data
compiled previously by other organisations (including Business International Corpora-
tion, Political Risk Services Incorporated, Political and Economic Risk Consultancy and
the Institute for Management Development). The average corruption scores reported in
Table 1 are obtained by taking averages of the indices for the periods 1980-85, 1988-82
and 1995-1999. As is common practice, we apply a simple transformation to convert
the TPI into a “corruption perception index” (CPI) which measures the level of corrup-
tion on an increasing scale from 0 to 10. The transformation is given by CPI value =
10 − TPI value. Further details about both our corruption and growth data can be
found by visiting the appropriate web-sites, www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html
and pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php site/pwt index.php.
4There are some notable outliers in these regions that deserve a mention. Botswana,
for example, is often heralded as Africa’s success story, having seemingly been able to
control corruption and enjoy high growth. Likewise, Chile has distinguished itself in Latin
America by establishing a similar track record.
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generally, why might corruption be less harmful in some countries than in
others?5
One possible answer to the above questions is related to the empirical
results of Neeman et al. (2008), who re-examine the negative relationship
between corruption and development on the basis of the degree of openness
of economies. Using a variety of model speciﬁcations, it is found that this
relationship holds only for countries that are very open, especially in terms
of their ﬁnancial integration with the rest of the world. For countries that
are not very well integrated, the relationship more-or-less disappears. An
obvious explanation for this is that fewer restrictions on cross-border ﬁnancial
transactions makes it easier for corrupt individuals to hide their illegal income
by laundering it abroad. As such, the incentives to engage in corruption, and
the eﬀects thereof, are likely to be much greater in this case than in a less
liberalised environment where resources cannot be syphoned oﬀ so easily.
This idea may well have some truth in it, but it does not resolve the puzzle
of the East Asian experience. As far back as the 1980s, countries such as
Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea were classiﬁed as open economies (e.g.,
Sachs and Warner 1995); yet corruption in these countries has been much
less destructive (if at all) than corruption in other nations of the world.
Another possible answer to the questions is given by the so-called “speed
money” hypothesis of corruption. According to this, corrupt transactions
between private and public agents are a means of circumventing cumber-
some and pervasive regulations (red tape) that are detrimental to eﬃciency
(e.g., Huntington 1968; Leﬀ 1964; Leys 1970). This argument - an appli-
cation of the theory of the second best - views bribery and other forms of
kickback, not as any hindrance to the economy, but as convenient devices for
overcoming institutional hurdles that distort incentives and opportunities.
Whilst plausible at ﬁrst glance, the argument can be challenged on both
conceptual and empirical grounds. Conceptually, there are at least two main
problems: ﬁrst, although bribery may speed up individual transactions with
bureaucrats, both the sizes of bribes and the number of transactions may
increase so as to produce an overall net loss in eﬃciency; second, and more
fundamentally, the distortions that bribes are meant to mitigate are often
the result of corrupt practices to begin with and should therefore be treated
as endogenous, rather than exogenous, to the bureaucratic process. Empir-
ically, the evidence oﬀers very little support to the hypothesis: in Ades and
5The same questions are invited from the results of some simple regressions, which
paint a similar picture to the above. For example, the correlation between growth and
corruption is signifcantly negative for sub-Saharan African and Latin American countries,
but is only so for South and South-East Asian countries when China, Indonesia, South
Korea and Thailand are excluded from the sample.
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Di Tella (1997), Mauro (1995) and Meon and Sekkat (2005), it is found that
the correlation between growth and corruption is consistently negative (and
particularly strong) in samples of countries with reputedly high levels of red
tape, weak rules of law and widespread government ineﬃciencies (the type of
environment where the argument is most relevant). In Kaufmann and Wei
(2000), it is found that the use of bribes to speed up the bureaucratic process
is largely self-defeating, as the amount of time negotiating bribes increases.
A ﬁnal possible answer to the questions is suggested in the discussion
of Shleifer and Vishny (1993) on the organisation of corruption. The basic
idea has to do with the fact that, in order to conduct business, individuals
often need to procure several diﬀerent types of governmental good (licenses,
permits, certiﬁcates, etc.) that are complements to each other and that are
provided by diﬀerent governmental agencies or departments. Under such
circumstances, the extent to which public oﬃcials are organised in their ex-
traction of bribes can have an important inﬂuence on the consequences of
bribery. If bureaucrats are disorganised and act as independent monopolists,
then each of them will seek to maximise his individual bribe income without
taking into account the negative eﬀect of this on the bribe-taking capacity
of others. This eﬀect arises since the demand for a bribe by one bureaucrat
in exchange for his own governmental good imposes a pecuniary externality
on other bureaucrats by reducing the demand for their governmental goods
and, with this, their ability to proﬁt from corruption. By contrast, if bu-
reaucrats are organised and act as a joint monopoly, then they will strive to
maximise their total bribe income and, in doing so, will internalise any exter-
nalities. In this way, a centralised network of collusive corruption can lead to
a lower level of bribe payment, a greater provision of governmental goods and
a smaller scale of distortions than would arise under a decentralised network
of non-collusive corruption.6 This argument has a good deal of merit and its
application to the East Asian experience is particularly relevant. As noted
above, this region appears to be divided into three distinct groups of coun-
tries: the ﬁrst - comprising Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore - are the low
corruption and high growth economies in which corrupt practices have been
6As also indicated by Shleifer and Vishny (1993), it is possible to obtain the opposite
result if governmental goods are substitutes for each other, or if the same governmental
good is provided by more than one bureaucrat. In this case competition between bu-
reaucrats in the absence of collusion could drive down the level of bribes relative to the
monopoly outcome in the presence of collusion. As noted by others, however, the condi-
tions for ensuring a competitive equilibrium (such as zero search costs for individuals in
their acquisition of information about bribe payments, and zero capacity constraints on
bureaucrats in their supply of governmental goods) are fairly stringent and not obviously
satisﬁed in practice (e.g., Bose 2004).
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curbed by strong autonomous states; the second - consisting of the Philip-
pines and South Asia - are the high-corruption and low-growth economies in
which disorganised corrupt behaviour has ﬂourished; and the third - consist-
ing of China, Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand - are the high-corruption
and high-growth economies in which organised corrupt activity has thrived.
Some recent evidence lends support to the view that the eﬀects of corruption
depend not only on the scale of illegal proﬁteering, but also on the nature
of this proﬁteering. In particular, it has been found that corruption reduces
investment by less when it is more predictable (more organised), and that
corruption and investment have displayed a positive correlation in the large
newly-industrialised East Asian economies that have centralised (organised)
corruption networks (e.g., Campos et al. 1999; Rock and Bonnet 2004).7
Theoretical research on the organisation of corruption has not progressed
much further since the seminal contribution by Shleifer and Vishny (1993).
An exception is the recent analysis of Celentani and Ganuza (2002), who
develop a game-theoretic model in which one group of agents (a constituency)
appoints another group of agents (bureaucrats) to ensure some prescribed
level, or quality, of activity (e.g., production) on the part of a third group
of agents (providers). The constituency is aware that a bureaucrat and a
provider may collude with each other in such a way that the former allows the
latter to engage in sub-standard activity in return for a bribe. Higher levels
of corruption prompt the constituency to set lower levels of required activity,
which reduce the gains from corrupt behaviour. Against this background, it is
shown how an organised syndicate of corrupt bureaucrats would maximise its
illegal income by limiting the number of corrupt transactions, a consideration
that does not arise in a disorganised network of rent-seeking oﬃcials. As a
consequence, the incidence of corruption (quality of activity) is lower (higher)
when such a syndicate exists than when it does not.
The present paper seeks to explore further the implications of alterna-
tive bureaucratic structures for the impact of corruption on economic per-
formance. As far as we know, it shares the distinction of only one other
analysis in studying the issue from an explicitly macroeconomic (growth)
perspective. That other analysis is by Ehrlich and Lui (1999), who focus
on the question of how opportunities to proﬁt from bureaucratic malpractice
may compromise growth by distorting occupational choice. The basic idea
is that such opportunities create incentives for individuals to devote less re-
sources towards growth-promoting activities (investments in human capital)
7It is worth noting that such networks are also a feature of some developed economies
that have a relatively high corruption rating (e.g., Italy). As regards the predictability of
corruption, we comment more on this issue in a later discussion.
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and more resources towards power-seeking activities (investments in politi-
cal capital).8 Within this context, the authors make a distinction between
a centralised bureaucracy (in which bureaucrats act as a joint monopolist)
and a decentralised bureaucracy (in which bureaucrats compete over relative
personal power). Amongst other ﬁndings, it is shown how growth may be
higher in the case of the former than in the case of the latter.
Our analysis diﬀers from that of Ehrlich and Lui (1999) in a number of
respects. Most notably, our focus is on the role of corruption in entry regu-
lation and the costs of doing business. The framework we use is a dynamic
general equilibrium model in which growth occurs endogenously through the
invention and manufacture of new intermediate goods that serve as inputs in
the production of ﬁnal output. Inventive activity (research and development)
is undertaken by entrepreneurs who require various licenses from public oﬃ-
cials in order to embark on this activity. These licenses are complementary
in the sense that all of them must be procured - otherwise, an entrepreneur
is unable to engage in any research venture. All bureaucrats are corrupt
and each one of them exploits his monopoly over the issue of a license by
demanding a bribe in exchange for it. We study the implications of this
when bureaucrats act either individualistically (disorganised corruption) or
collectively (organised corruption). These diﬀerent scenarios can be likened
to the above distinction between decentralised and centralised bureaucracies,
though the distinction in our case is not a question of whether bureaucrats
are engaged in some form of competition with each other (there is no such
rivalry in our model), but rather refers to the extent to which bureaucrats
coordinate their rent-seeking behaviour. Given this, we show that bribe pay-
ments are lower, innovation activity is higher and growth is higher when such
behaviour is organised than when it is disorganised. In this way our analysis
sheds light on the issue of why the eﬀects of corruption on growth appear to
be so diﬀerent across countries.
We emphasise that our analysis is not meant as a prescription for the
organisation of corruption. Whether organised or not, corruption is always
bad for development in our model and the best outcome is achieved when
it does not exist at all. The precise eﬀect of corruption is to limit entry
into productive activities, an eﬀect that appears prevalent in many countries
where opportunities are often restricted by the illicit costs of complying with
numerous procedures and regulations.9 Corruption is often seen as a form of
taxation, though one important diﬀerence in the case of entry regulation is
8In a static context, other authors have attended to similar considerations regarding
the misallocation of talent (e.g., Murphy et al. 1991, 1993).
9This is exempliﬁed by much anecdotal and empirical evidence, as we discuss later in
the paper.
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that, unlike taxes, bribe payments are made before productive ventures are
embarked upon. This can deter such ventures at the outset and may bias
entry towards those most able to aﬀord it.
It is still true to say that most theoretical research on corruption has so far
been conducted at the microeconomic level, using partial equilibrium models
to study speciﬁc questions and issues about the nature of corrupt behaviour
and the implications for eﬃciency and welfare (e.g., Andvig and Moene 1990;
Banerjee 1997; Cadot 1987; Klitgaard 1988, 1990; Rose-Ackerman 1975,
1978, 1999; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Rather less research has been de-
voted towards understanding the macroeconomics of misgovernance (par-
ticularly from a development perspective), though the literature is steadily
growing.10 In addition to Ehrlich and Lui (1999), Sarte (2000) is credited
with providing one of the ﬁrst contributions in the area, demonstrating how
corruption may cause resources to be diverted away from the formal (more
eﬃcient) sectors of the economy towards the informal (less eﬃcient) sectors.
More recently, Blackburn et al. (2006) reveal how corruption and develop-
ment may interact with each other to produce threshold eﬀects and multiple
(history-dependent) long-run equilibria, including a poverty trap equilibrium.
Similar results are established in Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2007), who
also show how corruption can foster inequality by compromising the eﬀec-
tiveness of redistributive policy, and in Blackburn and Sarmah (2008), who
show how corruption can inﬂuence demographic outcomes (life expectancy in
particular) through its impact on the provision of public health expenditures.
Finally, Rivera-Batiz (2001) illustrates the potentially adverse growth impli-
cations of ﬁnancial liberalisation when corruption is left unchecked. With the
exception of Ehrlich and Lui (1999), none of these analyses address the issue
of how diﬀerent types of corrupt behaviour may have diﬀerent consequences
for the economy.11
As indicated by much of the above literature (especially the microeco-
nomic literature), academic interest in corruption predates the emergence of
the issue as an item of utmost (if not foremost) priority on the international
development agenda. The high prominence that the issue now commands
(more than ever before) is due in large part to the rapid accumulation of
10In a purely static context, Acemoglu and Verdier (1998, 2000) conduct a general
equilibrium analysis of how corruption may form part of an optimal allocation in which
market failure is traded oﬀ against government failure.
11To focus on this issue, our analysis abstracts from the potential endogeneity of cor-
ruption, as studied by Blackburn et al. (2006) and Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2007).
Rather, we follow the approach of others (e.g., Rivera-Batiz 2001; Sarte 2000) by taking,
as given, the absence or presence of corrupt behaviour, and comparing the implications of
these diﬀerent scenarios.
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empirical evidence based on newly-acquired and continually-updated data
sets. This evidence, with much of its focus on growth and development, calls
for a macroeconomic approach to the study of misgovernance, an approach
that can yield insights into the aggregate eﬀects of corruption and provide an-
swers to some puzzling observations. Within this context, our analysis makes
a timely contribution by re-visiting the issue of the organisation of corruption
from a macroeconomic perspective that relates well to the current climate of
concern and debate.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we
present a description of the model. In Section 3, we solve for the general
equilibrium of the model. In Section 4, we compare and contrast the im-
plications of alternative forms of corruption. In Section 5, we make a few
concluding remarks.
2 The Model
We consider a small open economy in which there is a constant population
of two-period-lived agents belonging to overlapping generations of dynastic
families. Agents of each generation are divided into two groups of citizens
- private individuals (or households) and public servants (or bureaucrats).
The former are diﬀerentiated further into skilled and unskilled workers, who
supply labour to ﬁrms involved in diﬀerent production activities. The latter
are homogeneous and employed by the government in the administration of
public policy. To ﬁx ideas, we normalise the size of each group of households
to 1 and set the size of the bureaucracy to S.12 Productive activity takes
place in two sectors - a ﬁnal output sector in which a single consumption
good (the numeraire of the economy) is manufactured, and an intermediate
input sector in which a variety of diﬀerentiated producer goods are created.13
At any point in time, t, there is a ﬁxed unit mass of ﬁnal output ﬁrms, an
endogenously-determined number, Mt, of existing intermediate input ﬁrms
and an endogenously-determined number, Nt, of potentially new intermedi-
ate input ﬁrms. Each type of intermediate input is indexed by i ∈ (0,Mt),
with Mt representing the most recently invented variety. Invention occurs
through research and development by each of the Nt new entrepreneurs, a
12As in other analyses (e.g., Blackburn et al. 2006; Rivera-Batiz 2001; Sarte 2000),
we abstract from issues relating to occupational choice by assuming that individuals are
separated exogenously at birth according to their skills or through some random selection
process. In doing so we are able to simplify the analysis by not having to consider possible
changes in the size of the bureaucracy and possible changes in the level of corruption that
may result from this.
13Implicit in our analysis is the assumption that intermediate goods are non-tradeable.
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venture that is risky and that requires licenses from all public oﬃcials to
be undertaken. Successful research and development leads to an expansion
in the number of intermediate goods which raises eﬃciency in output pro-
duction and provides the mechanism for endogenous growth. All markets
are perfectly competitive, except the market for intermediate inputs which
is characterised by monopolistic competition.
Since the key features of the model lie in the production side of the econ-
omy, we make appropriate assumptions about the circumstances of agents
that enable us to simplify and focus the analysis. These assumptions mean
that, aside from rent-seeking activity on the part of public oﬃcials, the be-
haviour of agents is largely unimportant and can be essentially ignored in
the determination of equilibrium growth. For this reason, our description of
the economy proceeds by focusing exclusively on the behaviour of ﬁrms.14
2.1 Final Output Firms
The representative ﬁrm engaged in ﬁnal manufacturing combines lt units of
unskilled labour with xt(i) units of intermediate good i to produce yt units
of consumption good according to
yt = Al
1−α
t
∫ Mt
0
xt(i)
αdi, (1)
(A > 0, α ∈ (0, 1)). The ﬁrm hires labour from households at the wage rate
wt and rents each intermediate input from the producer of that input at the
price pt(i). Proﬁt maximisation implies the following factor demands:
lt =
(1− α)yt
wt
, (2)
xt(i) =
αyt
MtPt
(
pt(i)
Pt
) 1
α−1
. (3)
where Pt =
[
1
M(t)
∫M(t)
0
pt(j)
α
α−1dj
]α−1
α
, the aggregate price index. These are
the usual expressions that arise from equating the marginal product and
marginal cost of each factor. The expression in (2) shows that the demand
14The underlying behaviour of agents is summarised as follows. Each agent (a private
or public citizen) works only when young and consumes only when old. An agent works by
supplying inelastically one unit of labour endowment to his particular occupation in return
for a wage. This, and any other, income is saved at the exogenously given world rate of
interest. All agents are risk neutral, deriving linear utility from retirement consumption
which is ﬁnanced from savings.
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for labour is a decreasing function of the wage, whilst the expression in (3)
shows that the demand for each intermediate input is a decreasing function
of the relative price of that input.
2.2 Intermediate Input Firms
An intermediate good is created from a design, or blueprint, that arises
out of successful innovation by ﬁrms engaged in research and development
activity. By way of ensuring the existence of such activity, we assume that
any ﬁrm which innovates has a perpetual monopoly right over the use of its
design (i.e., over the manufacture and sale of its newly-invented product).
No other ﬁrm can ever exploit the same design to produce the same type of
intermediate good.15 Given this, then any ﬁrm that innovates can expect to
make positive proﬁts each period so that the incentive to undertake research
and development is always preserved.
Research is conducted using skilled labour and previously accumulated,
generally available knowledge. We denote by ht(j) the amount of labour
employed by the jth research ﬁrm and approximate the currently available
stock of disembodied knowledge by the existing stock of designs, Mt. Each
ﬁrm then has et(j) = ht(j)Mt eﬃciency units of input with which to under-
take its research.16 The technology for doing this is described by the function
q(et(j)) which gives the probability of successful innovation (i.e., the prob-
ability of designing a new product). We assume that this function satisﬁes
the following properties: q′(·) > 0 and q′′(·) < 0 (concavity); q(0) ≥ 0 and
limet(j)→∞ q(·) ≤ 1 (boundedness); and et(j)q′(·) < q(·) (elasticity less than
one). The ﬁrst property implies that there are diminishing returns to re-
search. As in other analyses (e.g., Blackburn and Hung 1998; Blackburn
et al. 2000; Jones 1995a; Stokey 1995), this feature is intended to capture
15For simplicity, we suppose that both the invention and production of an intermediate
good are undertaken by the same ﬁrm. Equivalently, one could assume separate sectors
of innovators and manufacturers, with the former selling their designs to the latter.
16The inclusion of Mt as an input to research and development is meant to capture
the well-established idea that there are positive externalities associated with this activity.
Essentially, we utilise Mt to symbolise the current state of knowledge embodied in the
design of intermediate goods. As argued by Romer (1990), such knowldege is fundamen-
tally non-rival in the sense that one person’s use of it does not detract from the ability of
others to use it. Thus, whilst an innovator may be able to exclude imitators from directly
proﬁting from a new design (e.g., by taking out patent protection that gives him the sole
rights over the use of his invention), the knowledge incorporated in that design is available
to everyone. In this way, the creation of new knowledge through research and development
has positive spillover eﬀects on all those engaged in this activity. Similar eﬀects arise from
learning-by-doing in other types of endogenous growth model.
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the notion of ‘crowding’, meaning the duplication of research eﬀort in the
presence of a limited stock of ideas: that is, a doubling of research input
need not result in a doubling of research output because some of the re-
search may be redundant. The second property is simply a requirement that
the probability of successful innovation lies in the unit interval. And the
third property ensures the existence of a unique equilibrium with positive
innovation activity.17
For research to be undertaken, a ﬁrm must acquire licenses from public
oﬃcials. These licenses, or permits, are complementary in the sense that
all of them are required, though each one is issued separately by a diﬀerent
bureaucrat. In the absence of any rent-seeking, licenses are issued free of
charge. In the presence of rent-seeking, licenses are granted only in exchange
for bribes. Let b denote the bribe paid by a ﬁrm to a bureaucrat in return
for a particular license. The determination of b is an issue to which we
turn later: it is the issue that lies at the core of our analysis and we prefer
to deal with it subsequently after completing our description of the basic
growth framework.18 For now, we simply note that bribes are determined
optimally according to the objectives of bureaucrats and the structure of the
bureaucracy, the latter being the key aspect of the decision problem. We also
note that, whatever the circumstances, the optimal bribe chosen is, indeed,
a constant, bt = b for all t. Since each and every bureaucrat demands this
kickback, the total amount of bribe payment that the ﬁrm must make is
B = Sb. Having made this payment, the ﬁrm can then engage in research
activity by incurring a ﬁxed cost of κ units of output and hiring skilled labour
at the wage rate Wt.
Given the above, we may deduce the expected net payoﬀ from innovation.
Let πt(j) be the per-period proﬁt that a ﬁrm could earn from designing and
selling a new intermediate good. With probability q(·), the ﬁrm succeeds in
its research and is entitled to the entire future stream of these proﬁts. With
probability 1−q(·), the ﬁrm fails in its research and earns nothing. It follows
that the expected net return to the ﬁrm is
17This last property is necessarily satisﬁed if, in addition to the other properties, q′(0)
is some ﬁnite value. It is worth noting that our choice of research technology is based
not only on its apparent plausibility, but also on its advantages over more simple (linear)
speciﬁcations that are often used. Such speciﬁcations imply an indeterminate number
of research ﬁrms, do not accord very well with the notion of a bounded probability of
innovating, and inevitably give rise to questionable scale eﬀects (e.g., Blackburn and Hung
1998; Blackburn et al. 2000; Jones 1995a,b).
18In this way we seek to provide a self-contained account of the mechanics of growth,
which will set the scene well for our subsequent analysis.
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Vt(j) = q(et(j))
∞∑
τ=1
(1 + r)−τπt+τ (j)− Wt
Mt
et(j)− κ−B. (4)
This is the payoﬀ that each individual prospective designer of an intermediate
good would expect to make by choosing to enter the research sector. Such
entry is not costless since the only way to embark on research activity is
to pay bribes beforehand. This acts as an additional ﬁxed cost which must
be taken into account by potential innovators. For each one of these, the
condition that determines participation (non-participation) in research and
development is Vt(j) ≥ 0 (Vt(j) < 0). Evidently, this condition is inﬂuenced
by a number a factors, not least of which is the size of bribe payment. We
explore this in detail in our subsequent analysis, where we show how the level
of bribes determines the equilibrium number of ﬁrms that choose to embark
on product design (i.e., the equilibrium size of the research sector).
There are two separate optimisation problems confronting an intermedi-
ate goods ﬁrm. The ﬁrst problem is to choose a level of labour input, ht(j),
that maximises its expected payoﬀ in (4). The solution to this is
Mtq
′(et(j))
∞∑
τ=1
(1 + r)−τπt+τ (j) = Wt. (5)
The second problem is to choose a price for its product, pt(j), that max-
imises its operating proﬁts, πt(j). It does this by acting as a monopolistic
competitor, taking into account the eﬀect of its price on the demand for its
product in (3). We assume that, once invented, an intermediate good costs
µ units of output to produce. Consequently, πt(j) = [pt(j)− µ]xt(j) and the
optimal price is given by the standard constant mark-up rule,
pt(j) = p =
µ
α
. (6)
3 General Equilibrium
The solution of the model is a symmetric, dynamic general equilibrium in
which the economy evolves along a balanced, endogenous growth path. As
indicated previously, growth occurs through an expansion in the number of
intermediate inputs as a result of research and development. The equilibrium
is computed by using the results obtained so far in conjunction with certain
other observations. In particular, we note that in our underlying model of
agents’ behaviour we assume that each skilled worker and each unskilled
worker supplies one unit of labour inelastically to their respective occupa-
tions (product design and ﬁnal output production). Given this, we can then
determine the market clearing conditions for both types of labour.
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Symmetry arises by virtue of (6) which shows that the price of each
and every intermediate good is the same (and constant). This implies an
aggregate price of Pt = p as well. From above, equilibrium in the market for
unskilled labour requires lt = 1. It therefore follows from (1), (2) and (3)
that
yt = Ax
αMt, (7)
wt = (1− α)yt, (8)
xi(i) = x =
(
α2A
µ
) 1
1−α
. (9)
The expressions in (7) and (8) imply that both the level of ﬁnal output
and the wages of unskilled labour grow at the same rate as the number of
intermediate goods. The expression in (9) shows that the quantity demanded
of each intermediate good is identical (and constant).
Given the above, it is evident that each intermediate goods ﬁrm makes
the same ﬁxed amount of operating proﬁts, πt(j) = π = (p − µ)x. Conse-
quently,
∑∞
τ=1(1+ r)
−τπt+τ (j) = πr . In addition, free entry into research and
development drives the expected net payoﬀ in (4) to zero. Together with (5),
these results imply that each ﬁrm engaged in research and development uses
the same ﬁxed amount of research input, et(j) = e, as determined by
[q(e)− eq′(e)]π = r(κ + B). (10)
From this we may deduce the following.
Lemma 1 Given that lime→0[q(·)− eq′(·)]π < r(κ + B), ∃ an e = ε(B) > 0
such that ε′(·) > 0.
Proof. Deﬁne Q(e) = q(·)−eq′(·). Since Q′(·) = −eq′′(·) > 0, then provided
that lime→0 Q(·)π < r(κ + B), ∃ a unique value of e > 0 that satisﬁes
Q(e)π = r(κ + B). Hence e = ε(B), where ε′(·) = r
Q′(·)π > 0.
The above result shows that, for each individual ﬁrm engaged in product
design, the equilibrium level of research input, e, is an increasing function
of the bribe payment, B. To understand this, note that (10) may be inter-
preted as determining the number of new designers, Nt, for any given stock of
existing designs, Mt. This follows from the fact that, since ht(j) = ht, equi-
librium in the market for skilled labour requires Ntht = 1 so that e =
Mt
Nt
.
As noted above, the term [q(·) − eq′(·)] in (10) is an increasing function of
e or, equivalently, a decreasing function of Nt.
19 Given this, then neither
19Note also that the term, itself, is positively-valued by our earlier assumptions.
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[q(·)− eq′(·)]π > r(κ + B) nor [q(·)− eq′(·)]π < r(κ + B) can be an equilib-
rium outcome. In the ﬁrst case the existence of positive proﬁts would lead
more ﬁrms to enter the research sector, implying that Nt would increase until
the condition held with equality; the increase in Nt is equivalent to a decrease
in e, or a decrease in ht, meaning that each ﬁrm, individually, operates at a
smaller scale. In the second case the prospect of negative proﬁts would cause
some ﬁrms to leave the research sector so that Nt would decrease until the
condition held with equality again; the decrease in Nt equates to an increase
in e, or an increase in ht, implying that each ﬁrm, individually, expands its
scale of operations. Now, suppose that either of these scenarios was to arise
because of a change in the size of bribe payment (a fall in B in the case of
the former, or a rise in B in the case of the latter). Then one obtains the
result that Nt and B are negatively related, whilst e and B are positively
related (as summarised by the function ε(·)).
Evidently, the fact that e is a constant means that Nt must grow at the
same rate as Mt. The same can be said about the wages of skilled labour
since (5) yields
Mtq
′(e)π = rWt. (11)
It remains to determine the equilibrium growth rate, itself. Given that
the probability of successful of innovation is independent across designers,
then the ﬂow of new designs is Mt+1 − Mt = q(·)Nt. Denoting the growth
rate of new designs by gt =
Mt+1−Mt
Mt
, we arrive at the following result.
Lemma 2 Given Lemma 1, the economy exhibits a constant equilibrium
growth rate of g = γ(e) > 0, where γ′(·) < 0.
Proof. Using e = Mt
Nt
, it follows that gt = g =
q(e)
e
≡ γ(e), where e is
determined in Lemma 1. Hence γ′(·) = eq′(·)−q(·)
e2
< 0.
As shown already, g is the growth rate for all other (non-stationary) variables
as well. In the absence of any transitional dynamics, the economy evolves
perpetually over time in a steady state, balanced growth equilibrium char-
acterised by an increasing variety of intermediate goods associated with an
increasing number of ﬁrms engaged in research and development.
The equilibrium growth rate depends only on the quantity of research
input, e, which is determined according to (10). The constancy of e explains
why long-run growth is sustainable in spite of there being diminishing returns
in the research technology. As the economy expands, there is an increase in
the number of intermediate goods and an increase in the number of ﬁrms
engaged in innovation. Each of these ﬁrms is able to exploit a wider range of
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ideas (because of the externalities from research), whilst being led to operate
at a smaller scale (because of the greater competition for skilled labour). The
upshot is that the probability of successful innovation remains constant and
that the economy, as a whole, experiences greater research activity which
enables it to sustain a constant growth rate of new designs.
4 Corruption and Growth
We are now in a position to address the main issue of concern to us - namely,
the impact of corruption on growth under alternative corruption regimes.
Corruption in our model takes the form of bribes paid by ﬁrms to bureau-
crats in exchange for licenses to undertake research and development. One
may think of bureaucrats as being able to extract bribes by being able to
simply reject license applications outright, or to delay the applications pro-
cess (which can be crucial for innovation), if ﬁrms are not willing to comply
with their demands. We assume that bureaucrats can do this without any
risk of detection or punishment. This assumption (used in other analyses) is
intended primarily as a simpliﬁcation, though it is probably near the mark
for many developing countries where the will and wherewithal to combat cor-
ruption are relatively weak.20 The way that bribe-taking inﬂuences growth,
and the way that this depends on how bribes are chosen, are the two matters
that occupy the remainder of our analysis.
The total bribe payment that a ﬁrm has to pay in order to engage in
research activity is given by B. This payment acts like an additional ﬁxed
cost to the ﬁrm and the eﬀect of it on growth is realised straightforwardly as
follows.
Proposition 1 An increase in the level of bribes reduces equilibrium growth.
Proof. From Lemmas 1 and 2, the equilibrium growth rate can be written
as g = γ(ε(B)) ≡ Γ(B). Hence Γ′(·) = γ′(·)ε′(·) < 0.
20Even when governments strive to be vigilant, corruption may thrive for a number of
reasons, such as the prohibitive costs of ﬁghting it when resources are scarce, the inherent
diﬃculties in detecting it when monitoring is imprecise and the innate problems in exposing
it when monitoring is abused. The last of these possibilities (where those appointed as
vigilance oﬃcers are themselves open to bribes) bears on the interesting and complex
issue of corruption in hierarchies (e.g., Basu et al. 1992; Marjit and Shi 1998; Mishra
2002). From a normative perspective, it has been shown by Bose (2004) how imperfect
vigilance, combined with direct penalties for bribe-taking, may lead to outcomes that are
Pareto-inferior to those that would occur if no sanctions were applied at all. Some speciﬁc
examples of anti-corruption strategies are discussed later in the paper.
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This result arises as follows. An increase in bribe payments increases the
costs of research and development. As we have seen, this causes an increase
in the level of research input, e, for each ﬁrm that chooses to embark on such
a venture, but it does so only by reducing the total number of such ﬁrms,
Nt. The net eﬀect is that, whilst each designer, individually, operates at a
larger scale, the economy, as a whole, suﬀers a decline in research activity.21
In short, corruption impedes growth by limiting entry into the business of
innovation. There is, of course, an obvious implication of this.
Corollary 1 The growth rate of a corrupt economy is always lower than the
growth rate of a non-corrupt economy.
Proof. The growth rate is g = Γ(B). Since Γ′(·) < 0, then Γ(B) < Γ(0) for
any B > 0.
Having established the above, we now consider how bribe payments,
themselves, are determined. Recall that B = Sb, where S is the number
of bureaucrats and b is the bribe that each bureaucrat demands. We study
two alternative scenarios: the ﬁrst - disorganised corruption - is when each
bureaucrat acts as an independent monopolist, choosing a level of bribe that
maximises his own illegal income without consideration of the aggregate im-
plications of bribe-taking. The second - organised corruption - is when the
bureaucracy, as a whole, acts as a joint monopoly, choosing a level of bribe
that maximises the illegal income of all (or each) of its members and ac-
knowledging the aggregate eﬀects of its behaviour. In both cases we assume
that bureaucrats, whilst never being caught, incur some costs from their cor-
rupt activities. These costs may be thought of in a number of ways. For
example, corrupt public oﬃcials may need to spend eﬀort and resources on
arranging and concealing their illicit transactions, and may also experience
some moral shame or social stigma from abusing their privileged positions.
It is plausible to imagine that these costs are higher the larger is the scale of
the particular oﬀence. We capture this conveniently in terms of a convex cost
function that is increasing in the amount of bribe extracted from each ﬁrm.
This function is given by β(b) which is further assumed to satisfy β(·) = b at
both b = 0 and some b = b∗ > 0. These properties ensure that, at least upto
some level of bribe, a bureaucrat’s net payoﬀ from bribe-taking is positive
21Tracing back our steps, we have g = Γ(B) = q(ε(B))ε(B) =
q(e)
e , where e =
Mt
Nt
. From our
discussion of Lemma 1, both the numerator and denominator of this expression increase
with an increase in B (because of the decrease in Nt). The latter eﬀect more than oﬀsets
the former eﬀect so that the net result is a fall in g.
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(i.e., b − β(·) > 0 for b ∈ [0, b∗]).22 The bureaucrat’s total net payoﬀ from
rent-seeking is given by It = Nt[b− β(·)], or
It = Mt
[
b− β(b)
e
]
(12)
Evidently, for any given Mt, It is maximised by maximising the term in [·].
Recall from above that corruption has the eﬀect of reducing the number of
research ﬁrms, Nt, causing an increase in research input, e, but an overall
reduction in growth. In other words, a higher demand for bribes implies a
lower bribe base. The diﬀerence between disorganised and organised corrup-
tion lies in the extent to which bureaucrats take account of this eﬀect when
choosing their optimal bribes.
When corruption is disorganised, each bureaucrat chooses his own level of
bribes, b, taking as given the bribes demanded by others and hence the total
bribe payment, B, that each ﬁrm has to make. In doing so, each bureaucrat
perceives that his own corrupt behaviour has no inﬂuence on Nt and therefore
e. The optimal bribe in this case - denoted bD - is given simply by
β′(bD) = 1. (13)
It follows from the properties of β(·) that bD < b∗ and therefore bD−β(bD) >
0.23
When corruption is organised, the collective bureaucracy recognises that
the total bribe payment of a ﬁrm depends on the amount of bribe paid to
each of its members: that is, it appreciates the fact that B = Sb. As such,
the bureaucracy is aware that its choice of b will inﬂuence Nt and therefore e.
One may think of the bureaucracy as making this choice so as to maximise
the individual payoﬀ of its representative member, or the aggregate payoﬀ of
all of its members. Either way, the optimal bribe in this case - denoted bO -
satisﬁes
ε(SbO)[1− β′(bO)]− Sε′(SbO)[bO − β(bO)] = 0. (14)
As above, bO < b∗ so that bO − β(bO) > 0.24
A comparison of (13) and (14) leads to the following result.
22This follows from the convexity of β(·), implying that β′(·) > 0 and β′′(·) > 0. In
addition, β′(0) < 1 and β′(b∗) > 1.
23It also follows that the optimal bribe is constant, as claimed earlier.
24That bO < b∗ may be seen from (14) which implies that a bureaucrat’s payoﬀ is
decreasing at b∗ (since β′(b∗) > 1 and b∗ = β(b∗)). It is also evident that the optimal
bribe is constant in this case as well.
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Proposition 2 The level of bribes under organised corruption is lower than
the level of bribes under disorganised corruption.
Proof. Recall that ε′(·) > 0, together with bD − β(bD) > 0 and bO > β(bO).
Suppose that bO ≥ bD. Then (13) would imply β′(bO) ≥ 1, in which case (14)
would require Sε′(SbO)[bO − β(bO)] ≤ 0 which is never satisﬁed. Hence bO ≥
bD cannot be true. Suppose, alternatively, that bO < bD. Then (13) would
imply β′(bO) < 1, in which case (14) would require Sε′(SbO)[bO − β(bO)] > 0
which is satisﬁed. Hence bO < bD is the only feasible outcome.
The intuition for this result is that an organised bureaucracy internalises the
negative externalities that arise from individualistic (non-coordinated) rent-
seeking behaviour. That is, the bureaucracy takes account of the fact that
an increase in the amount of bribe payment to each of its members reduces
the number of ﬁrms from which bribes can be extracted. The eﬀect of this is
to temper the demand for bribes, an eﬀect that is absent when bureaucrats
act alone and treat the number of potential bribe payers as given.
Given the above, it is straightforward to deduce the diﬀerent growth
implications of alternative forms of corruption.
Proposition 3 Growth is higher under organised corruption than under dis-
organised corruption.
Proof. The growth rate is g = Γ(B), where Γ′(·) < 0. Since BO < BD, then
Γ(BO) > Γ(BD).
The fact that bribe payments are lower when corruption is organised than
when it is disorganised means that the ﬁxed cost of research and development
is also lower in the case of the former than in the case of the latter. A lower
cost of research encourages a greater number of ﬁrms to undertake research
activity and thereby leads to a higher growth rate.
We emphasise that the above result is not meant as a prescription for the
organisation of corruption to be a policy objective. Whether organised or
not, corruption is always bad for growth in our model and the best policy
is to eliminate it altogether. What the result does show, however, is that
the eﬀects of corruption may be very diﬀerent under diﬀerent circumstances,
which may help to explain why some countries of the world appear more
immune than others to equally poor quality levels of governance.
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5 Discussion
Our analysis has sought to make further in-roads to the study of the macroe-
conomics of misgovernance. There are a number of aspects worth highlighting
and a number of issues worth reﬂecting upon. We single out just a few of
these which we regard as meriting most attention.
5.1 The Organisation of Corruption
Our distinction between organised and disorganised corruption focuses on the
extent to which bureaucrats take into account the aggregate eﬀects of their
rent-seeking behaviour. Based on this, we arrive at the result that organised
corruption is less damaging to growth because it tempers the demand for
bribes. As far as we aware, there is no empirical study that provides direct
evidence on the consequences of alternative corruption regimes. There is,
however, some fairly persuasive indirect evidence which lends support to the
general predictions of our analysis and which invites one to think of other
aspects that may be important.
Fisman and Gatti (2006) present a simple bargaining model of rent-
seeking in which ﬁrms and bureaucrats negotiate over bribe payments that
enable the former to circumvent various regulations. The analysis seeks to
explore how the negotiating process may be aﬀected by the institutional con-
text within which it takes place. According to the authors, institutions are
important for governing the extent of bargaining frictions which determine
the amount of time that is spent (wasted) on bargaining. The key result of
the analysis is that the amount of bribes paid is an increasing function of
that time. Using data from the World Bank’s World Business Environment
Survey, the authors ﬁnd evidence to support this result with the estimation of
a statistically signiﬁcant positive correlation between bribes and time spent
on bribe negotiations.25 The implication is that an institutional framework
with relatively few bargaining frictions is conducive to relatively low levels
of bribe payments. The example that immediately comes to mind is that of
an organised bureaucracy which allows for more eﬃcient bargaining than a
disorganised bureaucracy by eliminating the need for individuals to engage
in a myriad of separate bilateral negotiations with diﬀerent oﬃcials. In doing
so, it can also reduce uncertainty for individuals by making bribe payments
25As indicated earlier, Kaufmann and Wei (2000) obtain a similar correlation, though
the interpretation is rather diﬀerent. In that analysis the focus is on the opposite direction
of causation as the objective is to test the “speed money” hypothesis which implies that
higher bribes ought to reduce the amount of time spent negotiating - an implication that
is at odds with the positive correlation between these variables.
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more transparent and predictable.26 In a further set of regressions Fisman
and Gatti (2006) seek to capture this idea with a proxy for uncertainty that
measures the extent to which ﬁrms know in advance what bribe payments
they will be making. The authors ﬁnd that greater uncertainty (meaning
greater bargaining frictions) strengthens the positive relationship between
bribes and time spent negotiating.
Corruption-induced uncertainty is the subject of other empirical studies
which argue in the same way as above - that is, the extent of such uncertainty
depends on the organisational structure of the bureaucracy. Campos et al.
(1999) examine the eﬀect of corruption-induced uncertainty on investment
using data from the World Bank’s World Development Report. The eﬀect
is found to be large, negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Similarly, Wei
(1997) uses data from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness
Report to investigate how the predictability of corruption aﬀects foreign di-
rect investment. Again, the eﬀect is found to be strongly and signiﬁcantly
negative. To the extent that the degree of uncertainty depends on the type
of corruption regime, these results support the idea that a more organised
regime is less damaging to growth.
5.2 The Costs of Corruption
There are many ways in which corruption can impact on economic behaviour
and impose economic losses on society: it can damage incentives and destroy
opportunities; it can distort price signals and deplete resources; and it can
create uncertainty and compromise public policy. Our focus in this paper
has centred on one of the most pervasive channels through which corruption
is known to work - namely, the costs of doing business.
The speciﬁc mechanism by which corruption retards growth in our model
is a reduction in innovative activity as ﬁrms face an extra cost of having
to pay bribes to bureaucrats in order to obtain licenses to engage in this
activity. The relationship between corruption and innovation has yet to be
exposed to systematic empirical investigation. The only study of which we
are aware is that of Mahagaonkar (2008), who investigates the experience
26For example, individuals may be more certain about their total bribe payment when
this is decided and received by a single consortium of bureaucrats than when it is the sum of
separate payments made to a number of bureaucrats acting on their own. Additionally, as
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) point out, there is often uncertainty about bribes because there
is often free entry into the business of collecting bribes. A joint monopoly of bureaucrats
would have an incentive to limit the number of entrants, in which case uncertainty would
be reduced as individuals are assured that they will not be surprised by the approach of
additional bribe-seekers.
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of African countries using data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey.
The key ﬁnding is that, after controlling for various other factors, there is a
strong and signiﬁcant negative correlation between corruption and product
innovation. This ﬁnding accords well with our description of events.
From a broader perspective, our analysis is in line with the wealth of
anecdotal and empirical evidence on the general costliness of doing business
when corruption exists. This evidence is ﬂagrantly at odds with the “speed
money” hypothesis, the major problem with which (alluded to earlier) is that
the institutional hurdles for which corruption is supposed to substitute are
often the result of corrupt practices to begin with: that is, the amount of red
tape is typically determined by those who stand to beneﬁt from producing
too much of it. The literature in this area is replete with examples not only
of how red tape and corruption can impose signiﬁcant costs on ﬁrms, but
also of how ﬁrms often seek to avoid red tape by complying in corruption
and of how corruption appears to proliferate the amount of red tape. The
following is just a handful of observations that have been made.27 De Soto
(1990) recounts an investigation by the Institute for Liberty and Democracy
into the costs of setting up a small, ﬁctitious ﬁrm in Peru, a venture that
took 289 days of full-time work, with bribe payments being asked for on 10
occasions (and being unavoidable in 2 instances). Kaufmann (1997a) reveals
that 64 (44) percent of ﬁrms surveyed in the Ukraine (Russia) admitted
to paying bribes to overcome red tape, and that 96 (43) percent of ﬁrms
confessed to making illegal payments to obtain oﬃcial licenses and permits.
Brunetti et al. (1997) observes that, in a survey of ﬁrms around the world,
red tape and corruption were ranked amongst the highest major obstacles
to doing business (especially in the less developed regions). Similarly, the
World Bank (2002) reports that between 50 and 80 percent of ﬁrms surveyed
in developing and transition economies considered red tape and corruption
to be signiﬁcant constraints on their activities. In a subsequent study, the
World Bank (2006) estimates that the average length of time to register a
new business is usually more than 100 days in the poorer (more corrupt)
countries of the world, compared with less than 30 days in most of the richer
(less corrupt) nations.
5.3 The Fight Against Corruption
Nowadays, more than ever, the ﬁght against corruption is a global endeavour,
with initiatives being taken at both national and international levels to design
27Other examples can be found in Bardhan (1984), Bhagwati (1993), De Soto (2000),
Kaufmann (1997b), Mbaku (2000) and Sjaifudian (1997).
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and implement appropriate anti-corruption strategies.28 These strategies are
many and varied, and none of them are without potential weaknesses. In
what follows we discuss brieﬂy a few of the more well-known policy prescrip-
tions, pointing out their possible shortcomings and indicating how some of
them may be viewed within the context of our analysis.
One of the most popular proposals for combatting corruption is based on
the view that corruption (especially in less developed countries) is largely the
result of low public sector pay which induces bureaucrats to supplement their
legal earnings with illegal income (e.g., Chand and Moene 1999; Mookherjee
1997). Given that such is the case, it has often been suggested that a simple
way of eliminating corruption is to remunerate civil servants with suﬃciently
high salaries that rid them of the incentives to transgress (e.g., Gould and
Amaro-Reyes 1983; Klitgaard 1988). This idea - a type of eﬃciency wage
hypothesis - can be challenged on both theoretical and empirical grounds.
At the theoretical level, Besley and McLaren (1993) have argued that the
payment of above market salaries to bureaucrats may make sense only under
certain conditions. Focusing on the case of bribery and tax evasion, the
authors show how such a strategy can be counter-productive in terms of
maximising net tax revenues if the incidence of corruption is high and if
the monitoring of corruption is poor - which are precisely the circumstances
that one associates with less developed countries. From the perspective of
our own analysis, it is easy to see how the potential deterioration in public
ﬁnances resulting from eﬃciency wage payments may have adverse eﬀects
on growth: if these higher wages are paid for by taxes on ﬁrms, then there
may be fewer numbers of entrants into the research sector because of the
lower anticipated proﬁts.29 At the empirical level, Rijckeghem and Weder
(2001) present evidence which oﬀers some support for the eﬃciency wage
approach, but which also indicates that pursuing this strategy is likely to be
very costly because of the very high wages that are needed. By contrast,
Huther and Shah (2000), Rauch and Evans (2000) and Treisman (2000) ﬁnd
no such evidence, but rather suggest that the payment of high salaries to
public oﬃcials does little or nothing to reduce corruption.
An alternative strategy for attacking the problem is to make corruption
more risky and/or more costly for those who engage in it. This could be
28At the national level, many countries (including developing countries) have some form
of anti-corruption agency. At the international level, there have been a number of con-
ventions on corruption drawn up by the UN, the EU, the OECD and other organisations
with many countries as signatories.
29This is true whether taxes are levied directly on the proﬁts of intermediate goods
ﬁrms, or on the output of ﬁnal goods ﬁrms (in which case, the proﬁts of the former would
still be reduced due to a reduction in demand for intermediate goods).
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accomplished by increasing the intensity, coverage and precision of monitor-
ing public oﬃcials who may then think twice before transgressing because of
the higher probability of being exposed and/or the higher costs of avoiding
exposure. As above, a proper evaluation of this strategy would need to take
account of its other potential consequences: in particular, to the extent that
improvements in monitoring do not come free, but rather must be paid for
in some way, there may be implications for growth, either in the manner
that might occur in our model, or else through some other channel (e.g., the
absorption of resources that could have been put to more productive use).
A further approach to the problem is to diminish the opportunities for
individuals to gain from corrupt behaviour. One way of doing this might
be to increase competition amongst ﬁrms, thereby reducing the amount of
excess proﬁts from which bribes can be extracted (e.g., Ades and Di Tella
1999). Two potential problems with this, both exempliﬁed by our analysis,
are that bribes are often paid up-front before any proﬁts have even been
made, and that the squeeze on proﬁts may deter certain types of growth-
promoting activities (e.g., innovation). An alternative strategy might be to
increase competition amongst bureaucrats. If a governmental good (a license,
a permit or some other such document) is obtainable from diﬀerent oﬃcials,
then competition between these oﬃcials would drive down the amount of
bribe that each one demands for the good (e.g., Shelifer and Vishny 1993).
As mentioned earlier, however, the success of this may rely on fairly stringent
conditions that are not necessarily satisﬁed in practice (e.g., Bose 2004). In
addition, the strategy makes sense only if the governmental goods supplied
by multiple bureaucrats are substitutes for each other: if the goods are com-
plements, as is often the case and is the case in our analysis, then competition
is an irrelevant issue. A ﬁnal possible means of reducing the scope for illegal
proﬁteering is deregulation. Bureaucrats would have fewer opportunities to
extract rents if there were fewer rules and regulations that gave them such
opportunities. There are two main issues at stake here. First, as emphasised
above, the amount of red tape is often controlled by those who stand to gain
from it so that deregulation may not be an easy exercise. Second, not all
rules and regulations exist merely to serve rent-seekers and there may be
some positive amount of red tape that is socially optimal; whilst the beneﬁts
of red tape are not very well understood, it is possible to conceive of the idea
that there could be too much deregulation.
The foregoing discussion illustrates how diﬃcult it is to design anti-
corruption strategies that would be sure to work with unmitigated success
and that would not involve some sort of trade-oﬀ; and this is even assuming
that governments, or government-appointed agencies, are truly committed to
ﬁghting the problem, and are not without culpability, themselves. One ﬁnal
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point of consideration is how the organisational aspects of corruption might
bear on the issue. It is plausible to argue that curbing bureaucratic malprac-
tice poses a greater challenge when bureaucracies are organised than when
they are disorganised. A more closely-knit network of rent-seeking oﬃcials is
likely to be more eﬃcient in plying its trade and to be able to do this with
greater conﬁdence of impunity. Operating in concert as a single illegal syn-
dicate, bureaucrats can exchange ideas and share expertise, pooling together
their knowledge, resources and connections to identify “best practices” for
undertaking and concealing their surreptitious activities. They may have less
fear of being reported by colleagues, may enjoy greater privileged in-roads to
other areas of public oﬃce and may be more able to secure compliance from
their superiors. Indeed, the very idea of an organised corruption network
within the public sector conjures up images of a disease that is rampant at
both administrative and political levels. For these and other reasons, the or-
ganisation of corruption can be important not only because of its implications
for growth, but also because of its bearing on the ﬁght against corruption.
6 Conclusions
Corruption can take many shapes and forms, and it would be surprising if
all types of corrupt activity had the same eﬀect on economic performance.
Recent empirical evidence indicates that, whilst many countries have suﬀered
signiﬁcantly as a result of corruption, others have coped well (in some cases,
very well) with the phenomenon. The foregoing analysis suggests that one
explanation for this is the extent to which perpetrators of corrupt practices
- in our case, bureaucrats - coordinate their behaviour. In the absence of an
organised corruption network, each bureaucrat demands his own bribe pay-
ment whilst ignoring the negative externalities of this on the bribe-taking
capacity of others. In the presence of such a network, the collective bureau-
cracy internalises these externalities and, in doing so, tempers the demand
for bribes. The result is that bribe payments are lower, innovation is higher
and growth is higher in the case of the latter than in the case of the former.
Like almost all other analyses, our approach has been to focus on the
eﬀects of corruption, taking as given that corruption exists (in one form or
another). We have not sought to examine how the incidence of corruption,
itself, may change endogenously with other changes in the economic environ-
ment. This is not necessarily a major shortcoming: aside from the speciﬁc
objective of our analysis (which is to draw attention to the diﬀerence between
organised and disorganised rent-seeking), there is the widely-held view that,
for many developing countries, corruption has become so ingrained into the
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fabric of society that it is unlikely to disappear quickly or easily (if at all).
From the perspective of the present paper, the interesting question is not
so much why the level of corruption is higher in poor countries than in rich
countries, but rather why the nature of corruption appears to vary across
countries. The extent to which corruption is organised is one aspect of this,
but there are other aspects as well. For example, it is common practice in
some countries for arrangements to be made whereby kickbacks from pri-
vate individuals to public oﬃcials are given ex post (as a share of proﬁts,
for instance), rather than ex ante (as an upfront bribe, like in the present
analysis), and the presumption is that the eﬀects on the economy will be dif-
ferent in each case. The precise reason why corruption should take one form
and not another is an important issue which has been largely neglected and
which may well have just as much to do with cultural, social and political
considerations as it has with economic circumstances.
The implication of our analysis that corruption is always bad for growth
accords with the consensus view among development experts. As we have also
shown, however, exactly how bad the eﬀect is can depend on the particular
way in which corruption is practised, and there are clearly some types of
practice that are less detrimental than others. Given this, then our analysis
may be seen as oﬀering a cautionary note against anti-corruption strategies.
If ﬁghting corrupt behaviour is costly (e.g., because it uses up resources
that could have been employed more productively elsewhere), and if such
behaviour is not that harmful, then one ought to be wary of embarking on
a ﬁght merely for the sake of it. Anti-corruption agencies need to analyse
and understand the nature of corruption before trying to cure it, just as a
medical practitioner needs to examine and identify the symptoms of a sick
patient before prescribing the appropriate remedy.
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Table 1
Corruption and Growth in
Selected Regions of the World
Corruption % Growth Rate of
Region Index GDP Per Capita
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.4 0.4
Latin America 6.5 0.1
South and South-East Asia 6.3 4.4
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore 2.8 4.8
Philippines, South Asia 8.1 2.4
China, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand 7.1 5.9
Note: Figures calculated as averages over 1980-1999 for Sub-Saharan Africa and
Latin America and over 1980-1996 for South and South-East Asia.
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